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11. ARGUMENT IN REPLY

A. The District Court Erred in Applying the Incorrect Standard in Deciding the
Motion to Withdraw the Guilty Pleas.
In the Opening Brief, Mr. Stone argued that the District Court's denial of the motion to
withdraw the guilty pleas must be reversed because the District Court abused its discretion by
failing to apply the appropriate standard to its decision. Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 1517. In its response, the State has not addressed this argument.

In its brief at pages 6-7, the State agrees with Mr. Stone that when a defendant seeks to
withdraw a guilty plea, the court must first determine whether the plea was constitutionally valid.
If not, then withdrawal should be allowed. If the plea was constitutionally valid, the court must
next determine whether withdrawal should be allowed as a matter of discretion. State v. Dopp,
124 Idaho 512, 516, 861 P.2d 82, 86 (Ct. App. 1992); Jones v. Stale, 118 Idaho 842, 844, 801
P.2d 49, 51 (Ct. App. 1990). If a defendant offers a just cause for withdrawal of the plea, the
motion should be granted unless the State demonstrates that prejudice would result. State v.

Ballard, 114 Idaho 799, 801, 761 P.2d 1151, 1153 (Ct. App. 1988), citing State v. Henderson,
113 Idaho 41 1,744 P.2d 795 (Ct. App. 1987). See Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 15-16.
The record is clear that the Court did not apply this standard in denying Mr. Stone's
motion to withdraw his plea and the State does not make any attempt to assert the contrary. Tr.-10/19/06 p. 23. See Respondent's Brief at pages 6-10.
Moreover, the law is clear that in reviewing a District Court decision for an abuse of
discretion, the appellate court considers: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue
as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion

and consistently with any legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3)
whether the court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. State v. Hanslovan, -Idaho
-9

-P.3d -2008 WL 2512529 (Ct. App. 2008) (rev. denied), citing State v. Hedger, 115

Idaho 598,600,768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989). Here again, the State has made no attempt to assert
that this standard should not be applied in this case. Nor has the State made any attempt to argue
that if this standard is applied to this case, there is any way to avoid a finding that the District
Court abused its discretion. See Respondent's Brief at pages 6-10. Rather, the State has ignored
the abuse of discretion problem and argued only that Mr. Stone failed to prove a factual predicate
to support his motion. See Respondent's Brief at page 8.
The State's lack of argument that either the standard set out for a finding of an abuse of
discretion does not apply in this case, or that the District Court did indeed act within the
boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards the State itself
acknowledges as applicable to the case, leads to the conclusion that the State could not make
such an argument. The reasonable conclusion is that there was an abuse of discretion below and
that now this Court should reverse the District Court's decision and remand for further
proceedings on the motion to withdraw the pleas.
Therefore, Mr. Stone now requests that this Court reverse the order denying his motion to
withdraw his guilty plea and remand for further proceedings.

B. The State's Sufficiency of the Evidence Arguraerzt is Off Point.
Rather than addressing the fact that the District Court abused its discretion by not
applying the proper standard of review to the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, the State
focuses on arguing about the sufficiency of the proof for Mr. Stone's reasons for withdrawal of

his plea. The State devotes pages 8-10 of its brief to arguing that the denial of the motion should
be affirmed because Mr. Stone did not provide sufficient proof to support his motion. Not only
are there several problems with the State's analysis of whether Mr. Stone provided adequate
support for his reasons for withdrawal of the guilty pleas, but resolution of the question of
whether the District Court abused its discretion ill not applying the proper standard to Mr.
Stone's motion is not determined by whether the reasons for withdrawal were satisfactorily
established.
As discussed above, the District Court erred in not applying the proper standard to the
question of whether Mr. Stone's motion to withdraw his guilty pleas should be granted. As this
Court is not a fact-finding court, the appropriate remedy is to remand for the District Court to
apply the proper standard and make initial findings of fact. See, State v. Haworth, 106 Idaho
405,406-7, 679 P.2d 1123, 1124-25 (1984), wherein the Supreme Court refrained from making
findings of fact, instead remanding to the District Court for the missing findings.
The State's argument about the sufficiency of the proof for Mr. Stone's reasons for
withdrawal of his plea is not relevant to the question of whether the District Court erred in failing
to apply the proper legal standard to the motion. It is the role of the District Court to make the
initial findings about the sufficiency of the support for the reasons for withdrawal. It is not this
Court's role to step in and make the initial determination. Because the District Court abused its
discretion, this Court should reverse the order denying withdrawal of the pleas and remand for
further proceedings.

C . The District Court Erred in Finding That the Pleas Were Knowingly and
Voluntarily Entered Given They Were Entered Without Knowledge of the
Defenses Being Waived.

In his Opening Brief, Mr. Stone argued that the District Court erred not only in failing to
apply the proper legal standard to the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, but also erred in finding
that the pleas were knowing and voluntary. Appellant's Opening Brief at pages 17-20. The State
has not specifically responded to this argument other than indirectly through its assertion that
none of the reasons proffered by Mr. Stone for withdrawal were supported by sufficient evidence.
Respondent's Brief at pages 6-8. However, Criminal Rule 33 and the case law interpreting it do
not establish a minimal level of proof to support an assertion ofjust cause for withdrawal of a
plea.
I.C.R. 33(c) states only: "A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may be made only before
sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended, but to correct a manifest injustice
the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to
withdraw the defendant's plea." And, the case law liltewise does not establish a minimal
standard of proof. As set out in State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho 512, 515, 861 P.2d 82, 85 (1992), "On
appeal, voluntariness of the guilty plea and waiver must he reasonably inferred from the record as
a whole." And, "Defendants seeking to withdraw a guilty plea . . . must show a just reason . . .
The defendant's failure to present and support a plausible reason will dictate against granting of
withdrawal . . ." Id. Moreover, the District Court is granted broad discretion to grant or deny a
motion to withdraw a plea made before sentencing and is encouraged to exercise that discretion
liberally. State v. Henderson, 113 Idaho 41 1,414,744 P.2d 795,798 (Ct. App. 1987).
While the State would like this Court to find that there was some burden of proof which

Mr. Stone failed to carry, the case law does not establish a burden of proof. Mr. Stone set out
reasons in his motion filed by counsel to support his request for withdrawal of his plea. The
State offered nothing at the hearing on the motion to rebut counsel's allegations. Rather, the
prosecutor only argued that the transcript of the plea hearing indicated a knowing and voluntary
plea. He did not address questions beyond that and did not rebut or dispute any specific factual
claims set out in the motion to withdraw the plea. See Tr. 31-32.
In signing the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas, defense counsel was affirming his
good faith in presenting the'motion. See, I.R.P.C. 3.1 ("Alawyer shall not bring a proceeding . .
unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so . . . ") and I.R.P.C. 3.3(a)(l) ("A lawyer shall
not lcnowingly make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal . . .") See also, Lester v.
Salvino, 141 Idaho 937,939-40, 120 P.3d 755, 757-58 (Ct. App. 2005), "The signer's signature
I

certifies that to the best of the signer's knowledge, information and belief after reasonable
inquiry, the pleading, motion or other paper is well grounded in fact, warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument . . ." See also, I.R.C.P. 1l(a). See also, State v. Rogevs, 143 Idaho 320,
322, 144 P.3d 25,27 (2006), holding that trial courts have an inherent authority to access
sanctions for bad faith conduct against all parties appearing before them and that a party acts in
bad faith when it willfully conducts itself improperly or acts with an improper purpose.

In signing the motion to withdraw the pleas containing an enumerationof reasons
supporting withdrawal, counsel was putting those reasons before the Court. While the State
could certainly dispute those reasons and offer proof against them, by putting those reasons in the
motion for withdrawal of the pleas, counsel had placed those reasons before the Court. Given
there is no minimal standard of proof required for the reasons, the State's argument that motion

for withdrawal of the pleas was properly denied "[b]ecause Stone failed to show a single factual
predicate of motion to withdraw" is not persuasive. Respondent's Brief at page 10.
Further, when Mr. Stone's reasons are considered, they do support a conclusion that the
pleas were not knowingly and voluntalily entered. As set out in the Opening Brief at pages 1820, Mr. Stone made his pleas in ignorance of several possible defenses. In making the pleas, Mr.
Stone did not knowingly and intelligently waive his rights to a july trial, to confront his accusers,
and to refrain from incriminating himself. State v. Dopp, 124 Idaho at 515, 861 P.2d at 84.
For this reason also, the order denying the motion to withdraw the guilty pleas should
now be reversed

D. The District Court Erred in Denying the Motion to Withdraw the Pleas as
the Motion met the Just Cause Standard Even Taking into Account the
Motivation for the Motion.
In the Opening Brief, Mr. Stone also argued that the District Court erred in denying the
motion to withdraw the pleas because his motion offered just cause for withdrawal. Opening
Brief at pages 20-23. Again, the State did not respond directly to this argument. See
Respondent's Brief at pages 5-10.
Rather, the State based its brief upon an assumption that the statements offered in the
motion to withdraw concerning the reasons for withdrawal should have been ignored by'the
District Court because additional proof up to some unspecified standard of proof had not been
offered. However, as set out above, there is no minimal standard of proof that Mr. Stone had to
meet. He put his reasons before the Court and the Court should have considered them. The State
was free to present argument and proof against the reasons, but it chose not to do so. The
reasons in support of the motion included that Mr. Stone had not been properly informed by

counsel of the potential defenses to the charges and that he had not been advised of the maximum
penalty. And, those reasons, as set out in the Opening Brief at pages 20-23, provided just cause
to allow withdrawal of the pleas.
E. The District Court Erred in Imposing an Excessive Sentence.
Mr. Stone was given a sentence that exceeded that recommended by the State by 333%.
He has argued that this sentence is excessive, inter alia, because the fixed term, given both his
age and his circumstances, is longer than his expected life span. Mr. Stone has cited case
concerning fixed life terms in supporl of his argument. Opening Brief at pages 23-26. The State
has argued in response that this Court should not consider case law applicable to fixed life terms
in assessing the reasonableness of this sentence. Respondent's Brief at pages 11-14.
While Mr. Stone disagrees with the State's assertion that this case law should not be
considered in this case, even if that case law is disregarded, his sentence is unreasonable and an
abuse of discretion. His sentence is unreasonable because it exceeds that needed to satisfy the
goals of protection of society, deterrence of crime, rehabilitation of the offender, and retribution
See State v. Izaguzrre, 145 Idaho 820, 821, 186 P.3d 676,678 (Ct. App. 2008) (rev. denied);
State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385,393,825 P.2d 482,490 (1992). As explained in the Opening

Brief at pages 25-26, a 25 year fixed term was not needed to protect society because indications
are that Mr. Stone is turnmg his life around and can be safely reintegrated into society before he
is 67 years old. For the same reasons and also because of the unique circumstances of the current
offense, a fixed term of 25 years is not necessary to deter Mr. Stone or others from criminal
activity. Further, any rehabilitation will be the result of the programming the prison has to offer.
Twenty-five years is undoubtedly longer than any rehabilitative programs available. And,

likewise, 25 years fixed exceeds any amount reasonable for retribution.
For these reasons, if the order denying withdrawal of the pleas is not granted, Mr. Stone
asks that the order imposing sentence be reversed
I

III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth in the Opening Br~efand above, Mr. Stone requests that the
order denying his mot~onto withdraw his guilty pleas be reversed and the matter remanded for
further appropriate proceedings. In the alternative, Mr. Stone requests that the order imposing
sentence be reversed.
1
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